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THE RAMIFICATIONS OF NATIONAL
BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION LABOR
RELATIONS*
David L. Pregory**
Robert J. Nobile***

I. INTRODUCTION

This Essay reflects on the ramifications and implications flowing
from the recent labor relations controversy in the National Basketball
Association ("NBA"). Until the fall of 1998, basketball was the only
major professional team sport in the United States that had not lost any
regular season games due to labor relations disputes. Alas, the NBA
came perilously close to losing its entire 1998-99 season, as the entire
fall 1998 and January 1999 portions of the regular season were canceled. With a new multi-year collective bargaining agreement ("CBA")
successfully achieved in early January, on the brink of the ownership's
deadline for cancellation of the remainder of the season, the NBA will
witness its first abbreviated season attributable to contentious labor relations. After literally only a few exhibition games, teams will play a
fifty game schedule, rather than the normal full season of eighty-two
games, from February to June 1999.
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After presenting the salient chronological highlights of the origins
of the dispute and the major features of the new CBA reached in January 1999, we will pose some open questions for the future of labor relations, both in the NBA and in related professional team sports, and,
more broadly, for labor relations in other sectors of the economy.
The NBA, perhaps more than any other major professional team
sport, has become a highly lucrative amalgam of athleticism, entertainment and popular culture. Most of the NBA's stars are multi-media
stars, cultural icons and, not coincidentally, millionaires. Through the
successful marketing and exporting of the "Dream Team" mystique,
NBA marquee players have become international celebrities. Michael
Jordan has approached the international star status previously occupied
perhaps only by Muhammad All.
Much of what the NBA had achieved, especially through its successful marketing and television-friendly packaging, was placed at serious risk during the contentious and acrimonious labor relations of 199899. Fan allegiance is an ephemeral, but very real, ingredient in the success of any major team sport. Baseball clearly reclaimed, and indeed
significantly expanded, its fan base through its wonderful 1998 season.
The homerun exploits of Messrs. McGwire and Sosa and the phenomenal team record of the world champion New York Yankees coupled to
reenergize professional baseball. The sport was redeemed from the lingering residue of fan bitterness engendered by baseball's abbreviated,
troubled 1994 season, when labor relations difficulties caused the cancellation of the late summer season, the playoffs, and the 1994 World
Series. Baseball may have enjoyed its best year ever in 1998, with the
game's renaissance and reclamation of its historically preeminent position as America's national sport.
As baseball prospered, basketball suffered several largely selfinflicted wounds in 1998. First came the 1999 retirement announcement
from the incomparable Michael Jordan.' Immediately in the wake of the
Jordan retirement came the dismantling of the world champion Chicago
Bulls by the retirement of Dennis Rodman and the free agency trades
regarding Scottie Pippen et al? Hence, some of the cornerstones of the
NBA's institutional marketing mystique suddenly evaporated. With no
1. See Mike Wise, The Final Word From Jordan,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999, at Dl.
2. Although announcing retirement, Dennis Rodman would ultimately sign with the Los
Angeles Lakers. See Frank Litsky, Lakers Shorten Harris'sSeason Even More, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 1999, at D2.
3. See Mike Wise, A Flurry of Activity Marks End of Lockout, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999,
at D2.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol16/iss2/5

2

Gregory and Nobile: The Ramification of National Basketball Association Labor Relatio
1999]

The Ramifications ofNBA LaborRelations

especially compelling successors to Mr. Jordan and the Chicago Bulls in
sight, these post-lockout events have further exacerbated the NBA's
problems in reclaiming and revitalizing its disillusioned fan base. An
ill-conceived basketball "charity" game during the lockout, with the supermajority of the proceeds originally destined to go to "needy" basketball players, and with only the small remainder of funds designated for
legitimate, bona fide charities, justifiably earned the National Basketball
Association Players Association ("NBAPA") union the "tin ear" award
for the nineties. This dubious achievement was no mean feat. In the
political arena, serious competitors for the "tin ear" award may be both
Ken Starr and President Clinton's endless batteries of lawyers. But, of
course, this is material for another Essay and a future day.

1I. THE SALIENT NBA LABOR RELATIONS CHRONOLOGY
The heart of the 1998-99 labor relations controversy in the NBA
was rooted in the owners' demand that the union endeavor to assist the
owners in saving the owners from themselves. The owners' plight had
its genesis in the "Larry Bird" exception to the salary cap, which, for
several years, has permitted a team to ignore the salary cap in order to
re-sign its own superstar player.4 More recently, however, the owners
were understandably alarmed by the wildly escalating, multi-year, nine
figure individual contracts awarded to new and unproven players barely
out of high school. Thus, the owners used these egregious paradigms-ironically of the owners' own profligate creation-to insist upon
bringing salaries under greater control through the controversial device
of a much more stringent salary cap. The owners ultimately were largely
successful in achieving their essential objective of more meaningful and
longer term salary cost controls over the life of the new multi-year labor
contract. Rather than the perpetuation and escalation of the "winner take
all" ethos of the marquee players, yesterday's likely beneficiaries such
as free agent Scottie Pippen-who was anticipating an annual contract
well in excess of twenty million dollars-were successfully capped, and
became, through the 1999 labor contract, salary-capped "losers"
(relatively) for much of their remaining careers.

4. This was an option the Boston Celtics conceived and invoked to retain the services of
the legendary Larry Bird for the balance of his superb playing career.
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A. Events Leading up to the 1998-99 Lockout
In June 1995, the owners and the players' union negotiated a sixyear CBA.' The 1995 CBA included a luxury tax of as much as one
hundred percent on large contracts if the percentage of basketballrelated income devoted to player salaries exceeded sixty-three percent.
to ratify the deal. 6 The owners subseIn July 1995, the players refused
7
out.
players
the
locked
quently
A new agreement was reached in August 1995.8 The owners deleted the luxury tax in exchange for the option to renegotiate the CBA
after three years, should the percentage of basketball-related income devoted to player salaries exceed 51.8%.,
In September 1995, a group of players, spearheaded by Michael
Jordan and Patrick Ewing, who were both clients of agent David Falk,
sought to decertify the union, with hopes of thereby rendering the owners' lockout illegal as an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of
the federal antitrust laws.9 However, the union was in internal disagreement regarding this unorthodox labor tactic, and the union's thenexecutive director, Simon Gourdine, was opposed to decertification.
Therefore, on September 12, 1995, the players voted to accept the sixyear CBA rather than to decertify the union.'" This consequently ended
the 1995 lockout.
Because of the controversy surrounding the ratification of the
CBA, Simon Gourdine stepped down in January 1996." Billy Hunter,
the current executive director, assumed the union's leadership on July 1,
199612 and commenced completion of the remaining details of the labor
agreement. Immediate controversy arose, however, over the distribution
of the television revenues between the two parties. While this disagree5. See NBA Players Failto Ratify Proposed Labor Contract,WALL ST. J., June 26, 1995,
at B4.
6. See id.
7. See Murray Chass, N.B.A. Locks Out Playersin First Work Stoppage, N.Y. TIMES, July
1, 1995, § 1, at 27.
8. See Clifton Brown, LaborAgreement Ratified by N.B.A. Players,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
1995, at B17.
9. See Murray Chass, N.B.A. Taking a Timeout for Decertification Results, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 1995, atB12.
10. See Clifton Brown, New Deal Doesn't Go Down Smoothly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995,
at B 14.
11. See Harvey Araton, N.B.A. Players Union Dismisses Gourdine, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
1996, at B8.
12. See Mark Asher, Mutombo Heading to Hawks; O'Neal Remains Unsigned, WASH. POST,
July 16, 1996, atE7.
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ment led to an hours-long lockout, the lockout was lifted once the union
agreed to the CBA in its entirety. 3 In addition to the mini-lockout, the
summer of 1996 witnessed a number of free agents being signed to $100
million contracts that inexorably drove team salaries well above the cap.
B. The 1998-99 Lockout
On March 23, 1998, in response to the rash of free agent signings,
the owners voted to reopen the CBA."4 The proverbial "last straw" was
the signing of Kevin Garnett to a $126 million contract.15 Garnett was an
unproven third-year pro, and his enormous salary led to predictably
higher salary demands by proven veteran free agents.
After a month of fruitless negotiations between the union and owners, the owners imposed a lockout on July 1, 1998.6 On July 24, 1998,
the union filed an unfair labor practice ("ULP") charge with the NLRB,
claiming the lockout was illegal. 7 Subsequently, in August 1998, the
union withdrew the ULP charge in favor of arbitration."
The lockout extended into the beginning of the 1998 scheduled
training camp. Eventually, all of the preseason was canceled. 9 The NBA

canceled the first two weeks of the season on October 13, 1998.'o In a
major blow to the union and its members, Dean John Feerick of the
Fordham University Law School decided as arbitrator that the players
were not entitled to be paid during the lockout.2 This aggravated the financial pressure on the players, some of whom had not received a paycheck since May. The owners, on the other hand, were still being paid
from the five-year, $2.6 billion television contract.
13.

See Clifton Brown, DealIs a Lock, Not a Lockout, For the N.B.A., N.Y. TIMEs, July 10,

1996, at Bit.
14.

See Mike Wise, Deflected Pact: N.B.A. Owners Reopening Labor Agreement, N.Y.

TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at Cl.
15. See Mike Wise, Wolves May Be Limited by Garnett's Contract, N.Y. TmIMS, Oct. 3,
1997, at C2.
16. See Mike Wise, PlayersFile Salary Grievance, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1998, at C6.
17.

See Selena Roberts, N.B.A. and Union to Resume Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1998, at

18.

See Murray Chass, Players Drop Charge, Look to Arbitration, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 14,

C2.
1998, at C4.
19.

See Mike Wise, Labor Standoff Knocks Out N.B.A.'s Exhibition Season, N.Y. TIM,

Oct. 6, 1998, at Al.
20. See Mike Wise, N.B.A. is Canceling Its First2 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at Al.
21. See Mike Wise, N.B.A. Owners Needn't Pay Locked-Out Players, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,

1998, at D1.
22. Certain key players, however, such as Michael Jordan, had provisions in their employment agreements which required them to be paid during the lockout.
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On December 8, 1998, the All-Star game originally scheduled to be
held in Philadelphia was canceled, prompting near-universal and major
alarm that the entire NBA season was in genuine jeopardy." This fear
was heightened on December 23, 1998, when Commissioner David

Stem announced January 7, 1999 as the absolute deadline for canceling
the balance of the season, if a new collective bargaining agreement was
not reached. 24 Finally, on January 6, 1999 the union and the league
reached a tentative agreement, which was ratified later that day by the
players and the owners.2'
23. See Mike Wise, It's Official: N.B.A. Cancels Its All-Star Game, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
1998, at DI.
24. See Mike Wise, Jan. 7 Is Stem's Deadline to Cancel Season, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
1998, at Dl.
25. See Mike Wise, With Little Time on Clock, N.B.A. and Players Settle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
7, 1999, at Al. The terms of the new 1999 CBA are in pertinant part as follows:
A. Percentage of revenues to be devoted to salaries:
1. First three years - no fixed number.
2. Years 4,5 & 6 - 55%.
3. Year 7 - 57% if the owners exercise their option for the seventh year.
B. Maximum salary:
1. 0-5 years playing experience-$9 million.
2. 6-9 years playing experience-$1 1 million.
3. 10+ years playing experience-$14 million.
C. Rookies: three year rookie scale with the current team having an option for the fourth year, but
current team has the right of first refusal. In the previous CBA, rookies were free agents after three
seasons.
D. Salary cap exceptions: teams can go over the cap by certain amounts to sign two players a season.
1. Year 1-can sign one player for $1.75 million over the cap, and another player for $1
million.
2. Year 2-can sign one player for $2 million over the cap, and another player for $1.1
million.
3. Year 3-can sign one player for $2.25 million over the cap, and another player for
$1.2 million.
4. Years 4-7-teams can sign one player for the average salary and another player at the
median salary in years 4-6, starting at about $1.7 million.
E. Maximum annual raises:
1. 12% for players who qualify for the "Larry Bird exception."
2. 10% for all other players.
F. Cost certainty: Years 4-7-10% escrow tax withheld from players' paychecks if percentage of
income devoted to salaries exceeds 55%. The players decide who among them must pay the 10%
tax.
G. Minimum salaries in year 1 of the CBA:
1. Rookies-$287,500.
2. 1 year-$350,000.
3. 2 years-$425,000.
4. 3 years-$450,000.
5. 4 years-$475,000.
6.5 years-$537,500.
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Im. RAMIFICATIONS

A. Forthe Labor Movement Generally
It is difficult to estimate the full impact that the NBA players' dispute will have on labor relations nationwide. There is a tremendous difference between NBA players and unionized labor generally, even when
compared to professional athletes in most other sports. The lowest paid
rookie in the NBA will have a minimum salary of almost three hundred
thousand dollars. The average union worker in the United States earns
about one-tenth of that amount. This vast financial gap between professional athletes and average American workers was one of the main reasons for the public's negative reaction to the proposed "charity" game
that was to take place in December 1998 in Atlantic City. The proceeds
from the game were to be used to help financially support the "lesser"
paid NBA players, none of whom had received a paycheck for more
than six months. In response to this public fiasco, the union decided instead to donate all the proceeds to a genuine charity."
Given these facts, one could surmise that what occurred in the
NBA may not have immediate applicability to other unionized settings.
Significantly, however, one critical fact was made crystal clear by the
manner in which the NBA labor dispute ended-the muscle of management. Indeed, after a lockout of over 190 days, the players made concessions that many of them and their agents once considered
"unthinkable." Indeed, management had wielded its power like a club,
and browbeat the players into accepting a package that was essentially
7. 6 years-$600,000.
8. 7 years-$662,500.
9. 8 years-$725,000.
10. 9 years-$850,000.
11.10 years-$ million.
H. Other issues:
1. Performance bonuses limited to 25% of the value of player's contract.
2. The union's group licensing revenue guarantee dropped to $20 million this current
season, and will be restored to $25 million in subsequent years.
3. Longer suspensions and higher fines for player misconduct.
4. All players drug tested once per season, and marijuana and illegal steroids added to
banned substance list.
See John N. Mitchell, Players, NBA Find Solution at Buzzer; Deal Paves Way to February Start,
WASH. TaiEs, Jan. 7, 1999, at Al.
26. See Mike Wise, The Stars Come Out, if Only for a Night, N.Y. Tzims, Dec. 19, 1998, at
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no better than what was on the bargaining table in the summer of 1998.
If highly paid basketball superstars who turned into warriors to battle
with management at the bargaining table did not have the leverage to
outlast management, what message does that send to average rank and
file workers?
Over the years, the number of workers in the United States in the
private sector represented by labor unions has been steadily declining.
This has led to an unprecedented number of once powerful unions
seeking to merge forces. The United Auto Workers, United Steelworkers and the International Association of Machinists, for example, are
currently involved in merger talks, as are the United Mine Workers and
the International Union of Electronic Workers. Perhaps the shrinking of
the nation's industrial sector, among other factors, can be blamed for
this phenomenon, but one cannot help but think that highly publicized
debacles involving unions, such as the termination of virtually all of the
Air Traffic Controllers in the early 1980's and the corruption in the
Teamsters, have had a major negative impact on the labor movement.
These events, coupled with the recent NBAPA fiasco, may lead many
workers in this country to think long and hard about the benefits of organizing or taking on management in a protracted dispute. Such hesitation would be based in the fear of losing their jobs to replacement workers or concluding at the end of a strike or lockout, when a new
collective bargaining agreement is ultimately signed, with a deal far
below their expectations, and substantial losses in income. Collectively,
the NBA players lost hundreds of millions of dollars.
When the Air Traffic Controllers were negotiating with the federal
government, they believed they had a major bargaining chip-the power
to cripple the nation's air traffic system. They went out on strike, and
were ordered by President Reagan to return to work or face termination,
for what the President termed a violation of their oath of loyalty to the
government, including their agreement not to strike."1 Following the
recommendation of their union's leadership, however, most of the
workers disregarded the President's edict, resulting in their termination.' Not surprisingly, as a result of the tremendous inconveniences
experienced by many Americans during the period when the terminated
Air Traffic Controllers' replacements were being trained, many Americans expressed support for the actions of President Reagan. Manage27. See Richard Witkin, Controller'sStrike Halts 7,000 Flights; Fines Loom, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 1981, atAl.
28. See Air ControllersTurn to a Wide Variety of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1981, § 1, at

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol16/iss2/5

8

Gregory and Nobile: The Ramification of National Basketball Association Labor Relatio
19991

The Ramificationsof NBA LaborRelations

ment had wielded its heavy hand, and the union lost. For years, the Air
Traffic Controllers' debacle lingered in the minds of many workers and
undoubtedly had a chilling effect on the strike initiative by the labor
movement. It was not until well over a decade later, when the Teamsters
took on and achieved a favorable settlement from United Parcel Service
("UPS") involving its part-time workforce, that the labor movement appeared to show renewed signs of life. Because of the NBA lockout,
however, the gains realized by the labor movement as a result of the
UPS settlements may be short-lived.
During a union organizational drive, for example, management invariably warns workers that a union can promise them the proverbial
moon, but guarantee them nothing. Additionally, management typically
warns workers that if they join a union and ultimately strike, they can be
permanently replaced. Furthermore, management often informs workers
that under the law, while they are required to bargain with the employees' representatives in good faith, they are not obligated to give in to
any union demands. It is not difficult to envision management pointing
directly to the Air Traffic Controllers and the NBA players as prime examples of unions, with seemingly significant leverage in bargaining,
nevertheless being pummeled into submission by management. After
all, if star NBA players like Michael Jordan and Patrick Ewing, among
others, cannot defeat management-who can? A powerful weapon for
management indeed! How long management in other settings may ride
the NBA's victory horse remains to be seen. However, if the Air Traffic
Controllers' fiasco can be used as an analogous benchmark, the NBA
players' disaster will set the tone in labor-management circles for years
to come.
B. For Other ProfessionalSports
The maximum salary provisions in the NBA contract will not
translate into other sports. Other sports' unions are stronger and probably more unified internally, and have better resources than the NBAPA
did at the time of the lockout. The National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA") and Major League Baseball Players Association
("MLBPA"), for example, have huge warchests to support their members financially in case of a future strike or lockout. The NBAPA had no
such strike fund. This forced the players to accept more readily some
sort of deal on the owners' terms. Otherwise, the players would not have
seen a paycheck for more than a year. When David Stem imposed the
absolute deadline for canceling the season, many players panicked, es-
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pecially those who were on the lower end of the salary range. Significant vocal criticism of the union leadership accelerated from within the
union. There were real risks that the rank and file was going to vote to
accept the owners' offer and repudiate the position of the union's leadership.
Gene Upshaw, the NFLPA's director, encouraged the NBAPA to
decertify the union, so that they could challenge the owners' action in
court.29 The NFLPA took this course of action earlier this decade, and
ultimately won the right to free agency. Billy Hunter did not want to
take such action, because he believed that the NBAPA would remain
unified. When the prospect of not being paid for over a year was presented, the players took whatever they could get.
Major League Baseball will be the first sport whose CBA expires
after the 1999 NBA labor contract. The NBA contract probably will not
have any significant impact on the baseball labor negotiations because
of the MLBPA's foresight. In addition, the MLBPA will be prepared to
deal with a cap proposal by the owners, and will almost definitely respond in the negative.
The NBAPA has backed itself into a corner with the 1999 labor
contract. The league's "cap" before this agreement had many loopholes,
and many teams were well above the salary cap. The precedent has now
been set, so that salaries will be subject to a "hard cap." While there are
some concessions for re-signing two players, they are pyrrhic victories
at best. The owners have achieved a major financial victory with the
salary limits, as well as with other concessions that the players made.
The players' major concession beyond direct economics is the inclusion
of marijuana on the banned substance list. For years, the union resisted
putting marijuana on the banned list, although the other major professional sports already banned marijuana. Now that it is banned in the
NBA, the lifestyle of some players may radically change.
Thus, the owners have scored a significant victory over the players.
The owners have capped salaries, giving free agents much less leverage
to market themselves. This cap may bind a player to the same team for
his career, since he may not find a deal more lucrative with another
team. There may be a reversion in the NBA to a pre-Curt Flood economic environment, where free agency will exist in theory but not in
practice. The union probably will not be able to have this hard salary
cap removed in later negotiations. The 1999 NBA-NBAPA CBA proves
29. See Murray Chass, In FinalStaredown, Players Take the Hit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1999,
at D5.
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479

again that most labor relations in the United States continue to revolve
around control of labor costs as a major dimension of ownership
(un)profitability.
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